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TO: Secretary of State

NO: 500, AUGUST 8, 6 PM (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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HOPE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF SOVIET PROBLEM WILL BE HELPFUL IN  
PREPARATION FOR KHRUSHCHEV'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT.

RMR

ROOT OF PROBLEM LIES, OF COURSE, IN SOVIET IDEOLOGY TO WHICH KHRUSHCHEV AND TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE COMMITTED AND IN WHICH THEY GENUINELY BELIEVE. OUTSTANDING SOURCE OF TROUBLE IS THEIR BELIEF THAT CAPITALISM IS OUTMODED FORM SOCIETY WHICH MUST INEVITABLY BE REPLACED BY SOCIALISM AND EVENTUALLY COMMUNISM. SOVIET LEADERS INSTINCTIVELY IMPELLED ATTEMPT MAKE THIS COME TRUE, BECAUSE IF THIS BASIC TENET DISPROVED WHOLE CREED IS VULNERABLE TO ATTACK AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR HOLD ON POWER LOST. CREED HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO EXTENT OF ADMITTING CAPITALISM CAN BE OVERTHROWN BY PEACEFUL METHODS AND PARTICULARLY BY POWER OF EXAMPLE. KHRUSHCHEV STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT BY OUTPRODUCING US SUPERIORITY OF COMMUNISM WILL BE ESTABLISHED AND MASSES OF WORLD WILL DEMAND ITS ADOPTION BY THEIR COUNTRIES. ANOTHER BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT ONCE A COMMUNIST REGIME IN ANY COUNTRY SEIZES POWER, WHOLE STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST BLOC IS PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN IT. IN ADDITION TO INFERIORITY COMPLEX ATTRIBUTABLE TO NEW AND CRUDE COUNTRY COMMUNISTS FEEL NECESSITY ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS FOR VICTORY OVER FREE COUNTRIES IN EVERY TYPE COMPETITION FROM MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER TO SPORTS AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS.

WHILE IT WILL, OF COURSE, NOT BE POSSIBLE TO CONVERT A  
FANATICAL COMMUNIST SUCH AS KHRUSHCHEV IT MAY WELL BE

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By

44 NARA Date 1-8-78

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POSSIBLE SHAKE HIS CONVICTIONS ON SUCH MATTERS AS RELATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH OF SOVIET UNION AND US AND TO DEMONSTRATE FALSITY OF MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF WEAKNESS CAPITALIST SOCIETY. TO MAKE MAXIMUM IMPRESSION ON KHRUSHCHEV IT SEEMS ESSENTIAL TO ME THAT WE CONCENTRATE ON MAKING CLEAR NOT ONLY AMERICAN INTENTIONS -- OUR DESIRE FOR PEACE AND REFUSAL TO SURRENDER -- BUT ALSO LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH OUR SYSTEM. OUR TASK IS NOT THE IMPOSSIBLE ONE OF CONVERTING KHRUSHCHEV, BUT RATHER SEEKING PRESENT PICTURE OF REALITY TO WHICH IT IS HOPED HE MIGHT ADJUST.

BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL AS GENERAL APPROACH TO FOLLOW UP ON VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT THAT COEXISTENCE NOT ENOUGH BECAUSE IT DIVIDES WORLD INTO TWO CAMPS AND THAT WE MUST PROCEED BEYOND COEXISTENCE IN ORDER ENLARGE CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

ON SPECIFIC ISSUES IT IS POSSIBLE KHRUSHCHEV WILL TAKE STRONG POSITION IN HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND RESERVE SUCH CONCESSIONS AS HE MAY BE WILLING MAKE UNTIL PRESIDENT'S RETURN VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE WILL PROBABLY BE CAREFUL, HOWEVER, TO AVOID GIVING PRESIDENT ANY EXCUSE FOR NOT CARRYING OUT HIS VISIT HERE.

INCREASINGLY CLEAR WHAT KHRUSHCHEV BASICALLY WANTS NOW IS TO STABILIZE COMMUNIST REGIMES IN EASTERN EUROPE, PARTICULARLY EAST GERMANY AND POLAND, WHILE REMAINING RELATIVELY FREE TO FURTHER COMMUNISM WHEREVER OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF. HE DOUBTLESS ALSO SEEKS RELAXATION OF TENSION WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM DIVERT RESOURCES AND MANPOWER TO CARRYING OUT HIS AMBITIOUS ECONOMIC PLANS AND FOR SAME REASON TO OBTAIN WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY. I BELIEVE HE REALIZES THAT WITHOUT SOME PROGRESS ON THESE LINES HIS GOAL OF OUTSTRIPPING US IN ECONOMIC FIELD CANNOT BE ACHIEVED.

KHRUSHCHEV HAS MADE CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BERLIN PROPOSAL WAS HIS PERSONALLY AND I AM INCLINED BELIEVE

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PRESIDENT'S

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PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO TOP LEVEL TALK WHICH HE WAS ALSO COMMITTED TO SECURE HAS ENABLED HIM TO DEFER IF NOT ABANDON FORCING SHOW-DOWN ON BERLIN. WHILE HE COULD REVERT TO PREVIOUS POSITION IF TALKS GO BADLY I BELIEVE HE NOW REALIZES TO SOME EXTENT DANGERS OF SUCH COURSE.

I SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT KHRUSHCHEV DOES NOT CONSIDER HIMSELF AGGRESSOR IN BERLIN ISSUE. ACTIVITIES OUR PROPAGANDA AND INTELLIGENCE AGENTS THERE AND FLOW OF REFUGEES LEAD HIM BELIEVE THAT EAST GERMAN REGIME IS IN FACT THREATENED BY EXISTENCE BERLIN ON PRESENT BASIS. WHILE HE DOUBTLESS HAS IN BACK HIS MIND POSSIBILITY AND EVEN INTENTION THAT EAST GERMANY EVENTUALLY ABSORB BERLIN, I BELIEVE HE IS GENUINE IN HIS ASSERTION THAT HE PREPARED GUARANTEE MAINTENANCE PRESENT SOCIAL SYSTEM THERE AT LEAST FOR SOME YEARS TO COME. HE PROBABLY INTERPRETS OUR REFUSAL ACCEPT HIS TERMS AS INDICATION OUR DETERMINATION CONTINUE COLD WAR.

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SO FAR AS GERMAN REUNIFICATION CONCERNED, I AM CONVINCED  
PRIMARY FACTOR WHICH PREVENTS KHRUSHCHEV GIVING THIS  
SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS HIS INABILITY CONSIDER ABANDONEMENT  
OF A COMMUNIST REGIME AND FEAR OF CHAIN REACTION IF SUCH  
RETREAT EVER TOOK PLACE. HE BELIEVES THAT IN FEW YEARS  
LIVING STANDARDS IN EAST GERMANY CAN BE RAISED TO POINT  
WHERE REGIME WILL BE AT LEAST ACCEPTED IF NOT SUPPORTED  
BY POPULATION.

SOVIET LEADERS JUDGE US BY THEMSELVES AND ARE THEREFORE  
DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR INTENTIONS. ALMOST ONLY MOVE WE  
COULD MAKE WHICH WOULD CONVINCE THEM WE DO NOT HAVE  
HOSTILE AND AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS WOULD BE ABANDONMENT  
OUR BASES, PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY. I BELIEVE KHRUSHCHEV  
WOULD BACK DOWN IF WE SHOULD ACCEPT HIS VAGUE OFFERS OF  
MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL TROOPS FROM GERMANY, POLAND AND HUNGARY  
AND THAT HE WOULD COUNTER SUCH MOVE BY DEMAND FOR  
ABANDONMENT ALL OUR FOREIGN BASES. I REALIZE, OF COURSE,  
THAT EVEN MAKING SUCH OFFER WOULD HAVE GREAT DISADVANTAGES  
FOR US. IF SUCH WITHDRAWAL WERE IMPLEMENTED IT WOULD ALMOST  
CERTAINLY RESULT IN CIVIL WAR IN GERMANY AND PROBABLY  
UPRISINGS IN POLAND AND POSSIBLY HUNGARY. ONLY  
POSSIBILITY FOR PEACEFUL GERMAN REUNIFICATION I CAN SEE  
WOULD BE A SITUATION IN WHICH THIS DEVELOPMENT WOULD NOT  
BE CONSIDERED AS VICTORY FOR CAPITALISM OVER COMMUNISM.  
THIS WOULD REQUIRE TIME AND WEST GERMAN WILLINGNESS  
RUN RISKS OF CONFEDERATION OR OTHER STEPS TO FUZZ UP  
ISSUE, AND PARALLEL STEPS IN SUCH FIELDS AS DISARMAMENT.

I BELIEVE

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I BELIEVE TALKS WILL CENTER CHIEFLY ON GERMAN QUESTION, PARTICULARLY BERLIN, AND TRADE. ON BERLIN I SUGGEST PRESIDENT SHOULD EMPHASIZE WE MORE CONCERNED AT EAST GERMAN INTENTIONS THAN THOSE OF SOVIET UNION. PRESIDENT COULD POINT OUT THAT OUR TROOPS IN BERLIN ARE NOT IN FACT OPERATING AS OCCUPATION TROOPS AND AS THEY HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE WE CANNOT HELP BUT BE ALARMED AT SOVIET EFFORTS REDUCE THEM SINCE THIS IMPLIES DESIRE PLACE BERLIN AT MERCY OF EAST GERMANY. HE COULD POINT OUT THAT WE RECOGNIZE BERLIN IS A DANGER POINT AND OFFER ON BASIS OF RECIPROCITY TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSION THERE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER ANY AGREEMENT IS REACHED OR NOT. ON GERMAN QUESTION AS WHOLE, SUGGEST PRESIDENT SHOULD ATTEMPT CONVINCE HIM OF OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT CONTINUED DIVISION OF GERMANY MENACE TO PEACE AND THAT IF IT CANNOT BE RESOLVED NOW WE UNWILLING TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD FURTHER CONSOLIDATE DIVISION AND SOW SEEDS FUTURE CONFLICT. DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN THIS CONNECTION WILL BE THAT OF ATOMIC ARMING OF WEST GERMANY WHICH KHRUSHCHEV LIKELY HIT HARD. BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE PREPARED LAY GREAT STRESS ON OUR HOPES FOR GENERAL DISARMAMENT.

BOTH SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE AND THERE IS SOME DANGER THAT IF OUR ATTITUDE TOO NEGATIVE SOVIETS MAY BE INCLINED REVERSE PRESENT POLICY TOWARD CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES.

KHRUSHCHEV ALSO LIKELY RAISE QUESTION ON NON-AGGRESSION PACT AND THIS IS ONE AREA IN WHICH I SUGGEST WE SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR POLICY. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE BILATERAL NON-AGGRESSION PACT OR DECLARATION ON NON USE OF FORCE BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD AVOID PROBLEM OF EAST GERMANY. ON MULTILATERAL PACT WHICH PRESUMABLY WOULD BE WORKED OUT AT SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT MEETING, I BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED ARRANGE FOR SEPARATE EAST GERMAN ADHERENCE IN ORDER AVOID PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION.

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AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN COMING TALKS IS PERSONALITY OF KHRUSHCHEV. HE HAS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX CHARACTER, IS DANGEROUSLY IMPULSIVE, QUICK-TEMPERED, AND SENSITIVE TO REAL OR IMAGINED THREATS. I BELIEVE THAT IN GENERAL HIS INTERNAL POLICIES IN SOVIET UNION ARE TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN THAT THEY ARE TENDING TO MAKE SOVIET UNION MORE NORMAL COUNTRY IN WHICH PEOPLE PLAY SOME ROLE. IN CONTRAST TO STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV HAS GENUINE INTEREST IN WELFARE SOVIET PEOPLE. BECAUSE OF HIS AGE AND HEALTH AND IMMENSE STRAIN OF RUNNING COUNTRY AS LARGE AND HIGHLY CENTRALIZED AS USSR, I AM CONVINCED HE WILL NOT LONG REMAIN IN POWER AND THERE IS LITTLE ASSURANCE THAT ANY AGREEMENTS MADE WITH HIM WOULD BE CONTINUED BY HIS SUCCESSOR. PROBABLY MOST WE CAN HOPE ACHIEVE IN COMING TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS IS CONTINUATION PRESENT TRENDS WITHIN SOVIET UNION, SOME KIND OF SETTLEMENT OF BERLIN SITUATION, AGREEMENT ON CESSATION ATOMIC TESTS, AND APPRECIABLE EASING OF TENSION. THIS MAY GIVE US POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS ON GENERAL DISARMAMENT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. IN ANY EVENT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OUR RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION WILL BE PAINFUL AND DIFFICULT AND THERE IS LITTLE PROSPECT OF DRAMATIC SOLUTION.

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